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Introduction
The negotiations for accession to the European Union
should be more appropriately called “entrance
examinations”, rather than negotiations. The candidate
countries will have to demonstrate their ability to assume
the obligations of membership known as the “acquis
communautaire”. However, the candidates do have
room for manoeuvre in defining the terms of their
accession to the Union. The question is how much
“bargaining” power do they have and how can they
utilise it in practice?
This short note is a companion piece to an earlier
paper entitled “Negotiating Effectively for Accession to
the European Union: Realistic Expectations, Feasible
Targets, Credible Arguments”.1 The purpose of this
follow-up paper is to delineate the boundaries of the
negotiating discretion of the candidate countries. To
that end, it attempts to derive relevant lessons by
analysing the concept of negotiations.
Of course, simply by examining theoretical
concepts, we will not be able to arrive at a complete
answer to the question posed above. The complete
answer depends on the technicalities of each particular
issue under discussion and is further determined by the
context in which the negotiations for accession to the
European Union take place and the overall preparations
of applicant counties to adopt the acquis. Although, the
negotiations between each of the candidates and the EU
will be conducted bilaterally, they will also be held
within the context of the enlargement process and will
unavoidably be influenced, even decisively so, by the
outcome of the negotiations with the other candidates
and by the more general issues that will shape the
broader process of expanding the membership of the
EU. These kinds of considerations will be the subject of
a future paper.
In general terms, the objective of any kind of
negotiation is to arrive at an outcome which is acceptable
to both or all sides.2 Since there may be many such
mutually acceptable outcomes, the sides involved in
negotiations try to devise strategies that lead to the best
possible outcome as seen from their perspective. When
this problem is expressed mathematically, the task of a
negotiator is to find out whether the chosen options of
each side lead to an equilibrium solution. That is, to
obtain a solution, the optimum option for each side must
ultimately coincide. Otherwise, one or both sides must
make a different choice, which necessarily requires a
compromise and therefore a departure from the optimum.
The extent of this “deviation” or “departure” from the
initial optimum is determined by the negotiating effort,
strategy, power, etc., of each side.
It follows that the “art” of negotiation is to find a
way so that the best outcome, as perceived by one’s own
side, is close to what is believed to be the optimum for
the other side. This “convergence” of choices can be
achieved either by moving one’s own position or by
“pushing” the other side to move its position. The
former is often called concessions while the latter is
called exercise of power.
Nonetheless, much of the skill in negotiations
involves neither concessions, nor the exercise of power.
It involves, on the one hand, an appraisal of what is in
principle acceptable to the other side (and to one’s own
side) and, on the other, feeding information to the other
side to shape its expectations, precisely because the
strategy of the other side will be formulated on the basis
of assumptions and assessment of what is acceptable to
one’s own side. To put it in different words, negotiations
begin even before the bargaining starts, because the pre-
bargaining “posturing” and agenda-setting are also
significant to the final outcome.
Our analysis suggests that, on the basis of the
reasonable hypothesis that the applicant countries have
little negotiating power, the best strategy for them is to
aim for outcomes that would be close to those preferred
by the EU. As already said, this is because in this
context, negotiating or bargaining power means the
ability to force the other side to deviate from its optimum.
The outcomes that would be preferred by the EU are
largely those that can be derived from the application of
existing rules.3
The concept of negotiations4
There are two ways of defining negotiations. The first is
to look at the outcome of negotiations. Accordingly,
negotiations are an attempt to arrive at a mutually
acceptable result. As already mentioned in the
Introduction, each side tries to achieve the best possible
result for itself, so a satisfactory conclusion of the
negotiations is feasible only when the range of acceptable
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outcomes for one side coincide fully or partially with the
range of acceptable outcomes for the other side. Hence,
when one enters a negotiating situation, one must
necessarily have formed a view as to the range of
acceptable outcomes to the other side. Otherwise, if
there were no concurrence of acceptable outcomes,
there would be no need to negotiate at all.
The second way of defining negotiations is to look
at the basic characteristics of negotiations. All
negotiations, from buying a second-hand car to
determining the terms of accession into the EU, share
the same three fundamental characteristics:
• Process of discovery: The two sides inform each
other about what they need or what they offer. So
they learn about each other and form opinions about
the strengths and weaknesses of each other.
Information, therefore, is a vital instrument of
negotiations which can be used to shape perceptions
and expectations.
• Strategic interaction: In a negotiating situation the
two sides also seek to influence each other and
shape each other’s behaviour for the purpose of
achieving the best possible outcome for themselves.
The best possible outcome is the one which
maximises the gains and/or minimises the losses of
each side. So in negotiations each side sets priorities
and targets which it attempts to reach and tries to
predict the reaction of the other side to its own
actions.
• Process of exchange: Each side tries to shape the
other’s behaviour by offering something or by
conceding something. Each side’s strength is
determined by what it has to offer or deny to the
other side and each side’s weakness is determined
by what it requests. A mistake which is often
committed in negotiations is to concede something
simply because it is of little value to one’s own side.
The same thing may be of much greater value to the
other side and, therefore, can give significant
leverage to the side that can offer it.
The interaction of the two sides and the attempts to
shape each other’s behaviour take place on two levels:
• Technical level: Issues or disputes are resolved
with reference to a given set of rules, criteria or
benchmarks, without attempting to establish any
cross-linkages with other issues. This is because
cross-linkages make the resolution of one issue
conditional or dependent on resolution of another.
By contrast, resolution according to the given rules
in essence isolates each issue from the rest.
• Political level: Issues or disputes within a certain
(policy) area are resolved without reference to the
rules applying to that area. Therefore, cross-linkages
are necessarily established with other issues and the
final outcome is a “package” involving technically
unrelated issues. So in this context, “political
argumentation” does not mean politics in the
ordinary sense of the word. It only means the
definition of a “package deal” that includes
technically distinct issues and is acceptable to both
sides.
As mentioned above, a fundamental characteristic
of negotiations is the strategic interaction through which
each side attempts to influence the behaviour of the
other. Behaviour, and ultimately the final outcome of
negotiations, can be influenced or shaped in three ways:
• Legal/technical arguments: The use of legal and/or
technical arguments presupposes the existence of a
set of benchmark rules or criteria which are
acceptable to both sides. Much of the legal or
technical argumentation concerns the definition of
the appropriate benchmark criteria5 and the
interpretation of the meaning of such criteria.6 The
skill in using argumentation as a negotiating tool is
to identify the relevant analogy between the mutually
accepted principles and the issue at hand.
• Promotion of mutual interest: Here each side tries
to persuade the other side that what it seeks or
proposes is actually also in the interest of the other
side. This is probably the most effective way of
influencing the behaviour of the other side because
if that side finds that legal/technical arguments go
against its interests, it will inevitably seek to
“politicise” the subject under discussion by creating
cross-linkages and by resorting to power (if it has
any).
• Use of power: If legal/technical arguments are
ignored or are unsuccessful and if appeals to mutual
interest go unheeded, the only other means left for
influencing the behaviour of the other side is to
resort to power. As the famous 19th century German
strategist von Klaussewitz said that war is a
continuation of politics through other means,
similarly the use of power is the continuation of
negotiations through other means. However, power
in this context does not mean the use of physical
force. It only means the ability to impose conditions
on the other side or to deny something that the other
side wants irrespective of legal or technical
considerations. Hence, power appears at the political
level of negotiations where the outcomes are in the
form of a package or even involve deals with issues
that have nothing to do with the subjects under
negotiation.
From the preceding brief review of the main
components of negotiations it is obvious that effective
negotiation, in general, and proof of a country’s ability
to assume the obligations of membership of the EU, in
particular, have an important characteristic in common.
They both depend decisively on the use of appropriate
information and statistics. No one can negotiate
successfully unless he/she uses information effectively
both in transmitting it and receiving and then analysing
it. Information is vital, on the one hand, to establish
clearly one’s own position and views and, on the other,
to understand the other side’s position, views and
acceptable alternatives.26
Although there are basically two possible methods
of achieving one’s objectives in a negotiating situation
– persuasion and argumentation according to the
principles that apply to the subject under negotiation
and use of power to force the other side to deviate from
its optimum by cross-linking issues – it is always more
difficult to successfully manage cross-linkages between
the various chapters of the accession negotiations. For
one thing, there are no simple rules how to establish
such linkages. This is a matter of judgement for the
negotiators. For another, the exercise of power invites
counter measures. This means that any attempt at cross-
linkages will most probably be met with a counter-
attempt at cross-linkages too. The process then becomes
unpredictable and, therefore, very difficult to manage.
It is much easier (in principle) to demonstrate compliance
with EC rules to the Union and, where necessary, use the
EC’s rules to arrive at an outcome that is acceptable to
both sides. The latter relies on creative interpretation of
the rules.
Where cross-linkages have to be made, the applicants
are likely to be more successful if they emphasise
mutual interest, rather than attempt to resort to power
(of which they have little and which initiates a process
of counter-measures that is difficult to control). That is,
where an applicant cannot make any more concessions,
it would probably be more effective pointing out to the
EU that it is also in its own interest to minimise the cost
to be borne by the applicant and prospective new
member of the Union.
The emphasis on rules as a negotiating approach
also addresses one of the main tasks facing any negotiator;
that of adequate preparation and presentation of credible
positions. By giving prominence to the information
which is needed and the reasoning that should be used,
the negotiator in fact has to deal both with the issue of
strategy and the issue of preparation of negotiating
positions. These two issues are inextricably linked.
Understanding the dynamics of negotiations
The issues examined in the previous section can also be
analysed in a more rigorous manner. The use of a simple
model will enable us to highlight a number of other
important aspects of negotiating interaction and identify
more clearly the boundaries of the negotiating power of
the applicant countries.
In particular, this section seeks to formalise the
concepts of relative gains and losses and power. Without
claiming that other issues are unimportant, it appears to
us that the chief negotiators of the applicant countries
have two primary concerns: (a) how to present a credible
position to the EU (to demonstrate sufficient compliance
with the acquis communautaire), and (b) how to gauge
any negotiating power they may have and how to
wield it.
We addressed the first concern in the paper cited in
footnote 1. In this paper we expand on our previous
work by examining the link between the drafting of a
credible paper and the overall national strategy on EU
membership. As we explain in the last two sections of
this paper, the applicant countries and the chief
negotiators should look beyond the accession
negotiations when they prepare their position papers.
They will better serve their national interests by asking
how the targets they seek to achieve through the
negotiations will help their countries benefit more from
EU membership in the longer term. But, first, this
section takes a closer look at negotiating power. To
facilitate our task we will formalise the concept of
power.
A simple model
Let’s begin by defining a party’s objective in some
bilateral negotiations. Assume that the purpose of the
negotiations is to determine a certain common rule that
can be effectively implemented only if both parties
agree (e.g. exchange rate management, cross-border
cooperation in fighting international fraud, etc). Further
assume that each side derives benefits and experiences
costs from defining and implementing such a common
rule.
The negotiating objective of each side is to maximise
net benefits:
B = G(x) – C(x)
where B denotes net benefits, G is the function of
gross gains from regulation x, while C is the function
of gross costs of compliance with regulation x.
Each party derives the optimum level of regulation
x (that maximises B) by differentiating the equation
with respect to x and by setting it equal to zero (i.e. no
extra benefits can be obtained) so that
Bx = Gx – Cx = 0 [the subscripts denote the first-
order derivatives]
This means that x is optimised (from their
perspective) when marginal gains equal marginal
compliance costs, or Gx = Cx
The purpose of the negotiations is to define a
common x when xi (the optimum for party i) is not equal
to xj (the optimum for party j). As a result, both parties
will have to move away from their optimum solution.
Our purpose here is to understand how far each party
will be prepared to move when net benefits are very
much unequal, as in the case of the EU and any of the
applicant countries. That is, Bi* differs from Bj*, where
“*” denotes the level of B when x is optimised.
To gauge the willingness to move, we postulate that
their negotiating effort is a function of the potential
reduction in net benefits they suffer by moving away
from their optimum. In addition, we postulate that the
negotiating effort is directly proportional to the reduction
in net benefits. We can then define function, N, such that
Ni = ai(Bi* - Bic)
where Bic is the amount of B of party i determined
by the level of x which is commonly decided (i.e.
the outcome of the negotiations) and “ai” is a
parameter
Since B* is fixed and since it must be the case that27
B* > Bc, N must be a function that increases at an
increasing rate because the difference between B* and
Bc also increases at an increasing rate. This is caused by
the bell-shaped curvature of function B. The exact slope
of N is also determined by parameter “a”. Parameter “a”
which denotes how the size of potential losses translates
into negotiating effort, captures such aspects of
negotiations as the costs of the negotiations and other
procedural issues (in a way it corresponds to the
institutional constraints within which negotiations take
place). For our purposes we do not need to elaborate it
further. We also assume for the sake of simplicity that
negotiations themselves are costless.
If xi* is smaller than xj*, then the objective of
negotiations is to find an xc such that
xi* < xc < xj*
Ni has an upward slope rising from left to right and
starting at zero at point xi*. It reaches its maximum
value at the point where xi, say xi’, makes Bi = 0. That
is, xi’ imposes a constraint. By contrast, Nj has a
downward slope declining from left to right until it
reaches zero at the point xj*. It starts at its maximum
value where x, say xj’, makes Bj = 0.
For an equilibrium solution to exist xc must have a
value so that xj’ < xc < xi’. This means that Ni and Nj
must intersect each other, otherwise they have no
common value and, therefore, no equilibrium solution.
That equilibrium solution is reached when neither
side has any incentive to negotiate further. That solution
has a real life counterpart. Each side will initially be
willing to make small deviations from their optimum,
but as the deviations increase, so will their negotiating
effort because greater deviations will signify greater
potential losses. The equilibrium is at that level of x, xc,
where their negotiating effort is equalised. That is,
Ni at xc = Nj at xc, or ai(Bi* - Bic) = aj(Bj* - Bjc)
If the ratio of parameters ai and aj, ai/aj, represents
the “technology” of negotiations (i.e. is given by existing
institutions, skills, etc.), and if the tenacity with which
each party negotiates is directly proportional to the size
of the loss of net benefits, then the outcome of the
negotiations will be determined by the ratio of relative
losses of each party
(Bj* - Bjc)/(Bi* - Bic) = ai/aj
This simple result is illuminating because it shows
that the negotiated outcome does not depend on the
absolute level of gains and losses but on the relative cost
of deviating from the optimum solution of each party.
So in determining their negotiating strategy each party
has to make a guess, first, as to what is the optimum
outcome of the other side and, second, how much it will
lose out by deviating from that outcome.
There are two corollaries to the result derived
above. First, negotiators should not be impressed by
arguments about the size of absolute costs. In this sense,
it does not matter whether the other side is either much
bigger or much smaller, or whether the absolute gains or
costs are much bigger or smaller. What matters is the
cost of departing from the theoretical optimum, which
may be much less than not having any agreement at all.
Second, we see once more that providing and
obtaining information are important because this is how
each side evaluates the reaction and willingness of the
other to move away from its preferred position. We have
abstracted here from issues such as bluffing and
posturing. No party enters negotiations by revealing its
true preferences. Indeed, bluffing and misleading
information may change the final outcome drastically.
Note, however, that no one would suggest applicant
countries should bluff or cheat. They are under such
intense scrutiny that it is in their interest to demonstrate
to the EU their true preferences and capabilities.
We can now consider the concept of power, which,
in the context of this paper, manifests itself in cross-
linkages between different issues. To be able to do that,
we have to define power in such a way as to allow us to
explore the nature and implications of cross-linkages.
First, however, we need to motivate the definition we
use below.
As explained in the previous section, power is a
relative concept. It denotes, on the one hand, the degree
of a party’s control over resources or other assets that
another party wants. On the other hand, it also denotes
that first party’s need for resources or other assets
controlled by the other party. Hence, for the purposes of
this paper, power is a relative relationship denoted by:
“the ability to withhold something the other side
wants while having little need for something that
the other side is in a position to withhold”
This definition suggests that the power of party i is
greater, the greater the need of or benefit to party j from
asset y controlled by party i, and the smaller its own need
or benefit from asset x controlled by party j. Power, P,
of party i is a function such that
Pi = f[Bj(x, y), Bi(x, y)]
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that there is
a one-to-one relationship between B and our cardinal
measure of P and that the two parties experience net
benefits which can be expressed in the same units.
Under these conditions, the function above can be
written as
Pi = Bj(x, y) – Bi(x, y)
The net benefits of parties i and j from the
negotiations are, respectively
Bi = Gi(x) – Ci(y) and Bj = Gj(y) – Cj(x)
The cost borne by each party is the value of the units
of either x or y that have to be given up in “exchange”
of the gains of either y or x. This kind of “exchange”
establishes direct cross-linkages between x and y.
The negotiating objective of party i is to maximise
Bi = Gi(x) – Ci(y).The corresponding objective holds
for party j. This means that power can also be expressed
as
Pi = [Gj(y) – Cj(x)] – [Gi(x) – Ci(y)] = [Gj(y) +
Ci(y)] – [Gi(x) + Cj(x)]28
We can now see the relationship between negotiating
objectives and negotiating power. There are several
interesting cases (for simplicity the results below are
presented in terms of the effect on party i):
(i) The higher the gains of party j, Gj, the higher the
power of party i, Pi (ceteris paribus). In a way this
is not a very interesting result because it stems
directly from the definition of power.
(ii) Correspondingly, the higher the gains of party i, Gi,
the lower its own power, Pi. Again this is a direct
result of our definition.
(iii) Ci = 0 (party i faces no cost). This could happen
when party i experiences no costs in granting y to
party j or in making concessions on issue y. In this
case its power would be lower than otherwise,
ceteris paribus. Now, this is a rather unexpected
result. However, it does make sense because it
indicates that party i has more power (to refuse
something and/or to demand more of something
else) when concessions are more painful. Similarly,
the power of party i is lower, the more painful the
concessions of demanded from party j (i.e. Cj).
(iv) Gi = 0 (party i experiences no gain). Its power is
higher than otherwise because it is as if party i is
very difficult to satisfy. As many salespersons have
discovered, it is not easy to sell a product to difficult
customers with weird preferences or with little
need.7
The analysis can also be generalised to many
subjects. The objective for each party would still be to
maximise
Bi = Gi (xa, ..., xn) – Ci(ya, ..., yn)
where “xa, ..., xn” and “ya, ..., yn” are the various
negotiated subjects
Although we have not developed the tools in this
paper that would allow us to analyse such multi-subject
cases, there is an observation worth making. Assuming
that all subjects are of equal value, the greater (smaller)
the number of subjects for which Gj > 0 and the smaller
(greater) the number for which Gi > 0, the stronger
(weaker) the negotiating power of party i.
Preliminary conclusions
Contrary to common perception, if a party is interested
only in a few subjects, it does not necessarily follow that
it would be easier for it to be satisfied and that negotiations
would consequently be less difficult. It may also mean
that it is determined to negotiate much harder because it
has only few demands and, therefore, more power and
stronger negotiating position. The corollary is that when
a party is interested in many subjects, the negotiations
may become as a result more complex, but it would be
an easier task, ceteris paribus, to satisfy that party
because it would also have relatively less power (because
it would have many more demands).
The main result of the analysis is perhaps paradoxical
at first glance. When questions of power and negotiating
strategy are considered, the most commonly held belief
one encounters is that those who have power, gain the
most. Yet we have seen that there is an inverse
relationship between negotiating gains and negotiating
power because power is proportional to what the other
side needs and inversely proportional to what is requested
from the other side. In a sense, power is like a currency
that has to be expended to obtain benefits from
negotiations. The purpose of negotiations is not to
maximise power (i.e. deny everything to the other side
and request nothing from the other side). The purpose is
to maximise potential gains by making as many requests
as can be tolerated or satisfied by the other side. Not
surprising, the toughest negotiations take place in
situations where there is asymmetry between the parties,
when one side has little to gain or to lose or when it is
interested in just a few issues. In those situations,
mutually acceptable cross-linkages and trade-offs are
difficult to achieve.
It is for the reasons explained above that the
negotiator who wants to maximise his/her side’s benefits
has to take risks and make demands and offers that in
effect make his/her own side more vulnerable. This is
why negotiations are to a large extent unpredictable and
their successful conclusion requires a substantial dose
of judgement, discretion and willingness to take risks.8
The insights we derive from theoretical con-
siderations are very pertinent to the negotiations for
accession to the European Union. They show more
rigorously what is by now fairly recognised in Brussels
and national capitals; that the applicant countries will be
in a weak negotiating position if they attempt to make
too many demands on the EU and that the negotiations
are likely to be tougher for them than in the past because
of the sheer asymmetry between the EU and any of the
applicants (of course the negotiations are tougher anyway
because the acquis is much larger).
Above all they show the dangers of attempting to
resort to power through cross-linkages. The EU is likely
to be a demander on fewer issues than any of the
applicants (in the sense of asking for deviations from the
acquis, which is the benchmark for the negotiations).
Furthermore, any attempt on behalf of the applicants to
establish cross-linkages need not lead to a speedier
resolution of disagreements because it is also more
likely that any deal would founder on the objections of
at least one of the 15 existing member states. Resolution
would require the consent of all 15 Member States,
which means that as the membership of the EU increases
internal common positions will be more difficult to
achieve and, as a result, the EU will become a tougher
side.
Although the applicants are not powerful, they are
not powerless. They may not have the capability to force
the EU to accept bargains it considers unfavourable to
itself, but they can certainly act to further their objective
of gaining admission to the Union. Even though cross-
linkages would be risky, the applicants should not
ignore the possibility of moving the EU from its preferred
position with regard to those issues for which the EU’s
relative losses are smaller than those of the applicants.29
But, above all, it is certainly within the capability of
the applicants to shape the EU’s attitude through the
provision of the “correct” information. The sections that
follow explain how the applicants can further their
objectives by providing information that will boost their
credibility.
The concept of membership in relation to the accession
negotiations
A question that arises is whether the applicant countries,
which have little negotiating power, should concentrate
their efforts on persuading the EU that they do indeed
qualify for membership and that they can implement
Community rules faithfully and effectively? Not
necessarily. What should be clear in any negotiator’s
mind must be the motives of the country that seeks entry
into the EU. This is an important but potentially
overlooked issue. The motives are a mix of political and
economic objectives (e.g. political stability, access to
EU markets and funds, etc). Yet these motives are not
explicitly linked to the targets of the accession
negotiations.
The prospective entry into the EU is not only a
challenge or threat. It is also an opportunity to derive
gains which are not directly related to the subjects of the
accession negotiations. A case in point is the potential
boosting of the competitiveness of the economy of a
new member as a result of entry of foreign investors
who perceive it as a less risky place for business. In this
sense and in relation to the accession negotiations, the
question that must always be asked is the following:
“Will complete compliance with the EU rules, on the
one hand, or any requested derogations, on the other,
help us in the longer term to safeguard and even
strengthen, for example, our economy?” (The same
question can be posed about any other aspect of
membership.) In other words, the requested derogations
need not be those that simply protect the status quo
before entry into the EU. They should be those that will
be indispensable to an internationally strong economy
in the next decade or two. Perhaps paradoxically, to
identify the “right” derogations that should be asked for,
negotiators should look at issues beyond the negotiations
themselves.
We define in Table 1 three approaches to EU
membership and the accession negotiations. In the left-
hand column we identify three steps in the process of
preparation for entry into the EU. The first step is to
perform a “gap analysis” of the differences, similarities
and incompatibilities between the acquis communautaire
(i.e. the obligations of membership) and existing national
rules and policies. The next step is the definition of
negotiating objectives and the drafting of position papers.
The third step involves a much broader assessment of
the costs of entry into the EU and the opportunities that
are opened up by that entry. The adoption of the acquis
that is initiated and the definition of negotiating targets
take place within a wider framework of analysis that
incorporates views about the role that the country will
play as a member of the EU.
There are also at least three basic approaches in
relating the assessment performed at each step with the
accession negotiations. These are also shown in the
table. What we call the “passive” approach confines
itself to seeking derogations that simply minimise the
costs of adjustment and of adopting the acquis. The
“reactive” approach aims not only to minimise costs but
also to safeguard certain national policies which are
considered to be important for the national economy.
The “proactive” approach looks beyond the negotiations
and asks how membership of the EU can be used to
strengthen the national economy. Consequently, the
negotiating targets are not necessarily those that
maximise short-term or monetary gains, but those that
will enable the country to achieve it long-term objectives.
The right answer to the question above about the
derogations to be asked and the specific features of the
“right” model will undoubtedly differ significantly from
one applicant to another. Yet, the main message is the
same for all. Successful accession negotiations should
not be simply defined in terms of the number of the
concessions that can be extracted from the EU. The
successful outcome of the negotiations are those that
result in terms of accession that enable an applicant
country to become a strong and prosperous member of
the Union. (See Table 1.)
Components of a credible negotiating position
In this last section we examine very briefly what needs
to be considered in preparing a credible negotiating
position in the context of each applicant’s own
membership model. There are at least seven components
that make up a credible negotiating position. These
components are:
(1) The acquis that has to be adopted by the applicant.
(2) The objectives, views and attitudes of the EU (and
its member states) on the future development of the
policy/rules under discussion.
(3) The corresponding situation for the applicant.
(4) The contribution of the sector/industry under
discussion to the economy of the applicant and the
contribution it can make (or not) to the EU and to
the “common interest”.
(5) The capacity of the applicant’s public administration
to enforce EC and rules.
(6) The treatment accorded to other candidate countries.
(7) The precedents created by past accession
negotiations.
We have dealt with components 6 and 7 in another
paper.9 The remaining components, with the exception
of item 4, are outside the scope of this short note.
Component 4 is more relevant to this note because it
relates to one of the basic instruments in shaping the
outcomes of negotiations; i.e. appeals to mutual interest
or to the common Community interest. Such appeals
should constitute an essential characteristic of the
applicants’ approach to the accession negotiations.
Everything which is presented to the EU, either
opening positions or requests for derogations, must be30
hinged on some EU objective or EU rule. For example,
it has been found to be in the “common interest” to
promote the growth of under-developed regions, provide
financial services to Eastern Europe, promote cross-
border cooperation on R&D, protect the environment
and to attract back to EU flags ships and jobs for
seafarers (e.g. 1997 guidelines on state aid). It is also in
the “common interest” not to cause economic disruption
in a prospective Member State resulting in a widening
instead of narrowing of the gap between rich and poor
member states (e.g. Articles B EU and 2 EC).
In this context, a candidate country could benefit
more substantially in the longer-term if it obtained a
protocol that simply recognised the importance of the
sectors/industries under discussion to its economy and
acknowledged that the application of Community
principles and the formulation of Community
programmes will take that into account. Such a protocol
need not include any derogations. It would be very
similar to protocols obtained by Ireland, Greece, Portugal
and Spain. Their protocols acknowledged the need of
those countries to develop economically and pledged
not only Community support for that purpose but also
appropriate application of Community rules. This kind
of protocol could prove extremely useful five or ten
years after accession. Hence, the wording of Articles B,
2 and 130(a) on economic and social cohesion should be
used to preface any presentations on sensitive sectors/
industries or requests for exceptions. It would not be
difficult for the applicants to argue their case because
their Association Agreements with the EU already
provide that they are to be considered as “Article 92(3)(a)
regions” which qualify for state aid for regional
development.
More generally, the applicants should make clear to
the other side that it is in the EU’s interest to have new
members with healthy economies rather than members
with structural weaknesses. Therefore, the costs of too
rigid or too quick application of the acquis must be
highlighted in trying to persuade the EU that it is not to
its disadvantage to be flexible.
Conclusion
Any good negotiator sets his/her priorities before entering
the negotiating process. Similarly, the prospective
members of the EU would have to identify their own
priorities and their “bottom line” – what they cannot
concede. At the same time, however, they need to
understand the EU’s bottom line. It would make no
sense for them to seek anything that the EU will not
grant them (unless such demands are made as a
negotiating ploy, but this kind of stratagems are risky
because they spoil the atmosphere of the discussions).
There is also little doubt that the prospective
members will be expected to comply fully with the
requirements of their Association Agreements
(especially the provisions on free trade) and with the
acquis-compatible international obligations they have
already assumed in the context of GATT, IMO, etc.
These Agreements and international obligations cover
a substantial part of the internal market acquis.
In addition, full compliance will be expected with
the targets identified in the Accession Partnerships
which provide for the implementation of national plans
for the adoption of the acquis. However, it is still unclear
what status these National Plans will have because they
will be decided between the applicants and the
Commission while the accession negotiations will
formally be conducted with the member states.
It follows that the applicants will have more room
for manoeuvre in those areas of the acquis which are not
covered either by fundamental Community principles
concerning the internal market or by Association
Agreements or where the acquis itself admits to possible
exceptions. It is plausible, therefore, to conclude that the
applicants should not waste valuable negotiating capital
seeking derogations from fundamental principles or
obligations that they have long accepted under their
Association Agreements. In summary, they would more
effectively and productively concentrate their efforts on
(a) non-core areas of the acquis, (b) those provisions of
the  acquis that allow for exceptions, (c) issues not
covered by Association and other Agreements and (d)
issues on which the EU itself will be a demander.
As in all negotiations, during the accession
discussions there are bound to be attempts by all sides to
link issues. The success of the applicants in obtaining
exceptions or extra resources from the Union will very
much depend on their ability to link concessions in one
area with demands in another. Their position will become
stronger, the less willing is the EU to extend all privileges
and freedoms to them (e.g. free movement of persons)
and the more slowly the EU wishes to integrate them in
Community policies (e.g. common agricultural policy).
Ironically, their non-integration in one area may become
their trump card for supporting their requests for slower
integration in another area.
Bearing in mind the concepts of negotiations
explained earlier, we conclude that the best strategy for
a candidate country is to
• prove that on the whole it complies with EC rules,
• where compliance is not possible, demonstrate that
the exceptions it seeks are allowed by existing
rules, and
• the exceptions are in the EU’s own interest because
they minimise the cost of entry that has to be borne
by the prospective member and, therefore, reduce
potential demand for EU assistance.
RÉSUMÉ
Les limites du pouvoir de négociation des pays
candidats à l’adhésion à l’Union européenne :
considérations théoriques et implications pratiques
Cet article applique les concepts théoriques des
négociations à l’élargissement de l’Union européenne.
Il se propose d’examiner le pouvoir de négociation que
peuvent exercer les pays qui souhaitent adhérer à l’UE.31
Il conclut que les pays candidats auront une marge de
manoeuvre plus grande dans les domaines de l’acquis
communautaire qui ne sont pas couverts par les principes
fondamentaux de la Communauté concernant le marché
intérieur ou par leurs accords d’association, ou encore
dans un domaine où l’acquis autorise d’éventuelles
dérogations. Les pays candidats ne doivent pas gaspiller
leur précieux capital de négociation à tenter d’obtenir
des dérogations par rapport aux principes ou obligations
fondamentaux qu’ils ont acceptés depuis longtemps en
vertu de leurs accords d’association.
En revanche, ils pourraient concentrer de manière
plus efficace et plus productive tous leurs efforts sur (a)
les domaines non fondamentaux de l’acquis, (b) les
dispositions de l’acquis qui autorisent des dérogations,
(c) des questions qui ne sont pas couvertes par les
accords d’association ou autres et (d)) des questions
pour lesquelles l’UE sera elle-même demandeuse.
Comme dans n’importe quelle autre négociation,
toutes les parties tenteront au cours des discussions
d’adhésion de relier plusieurs questions. Le degré de
réussite des candidats à obtenir des exceptions ou des
ressources supplémentaires de la part de l’Union
dépendra très largement de leur capacité à lier les
concessions dans un domaine à des exigences dans un
autre domaine. Cela renforcera leur position, dans la
mesure où l’Union européenne est moins disposée à
leur accorder tous les privilèges et libertés (p. ex. libre
circulation des personnes) et qu’elle souhaite les intégrer
le moins rapidement possible dans les politiques
communautaires (p. ex. politique agricole commune).
De façon ironique, on peut dire que leur non intégration
dans un domaine pourrait devenir leur atout majeur
pour soutenir leurs requêtes d’une intégration plus
lente dans un autre domaine.
L’analyse théorique montre que la meilleure
stratégie pour un pays candidat est de :
• prouver que, dans l’ensemble, il satisfait aux règles
communautaires ;
• démontrer, lorsque la conformité aux règles s’avère
impossible, que les exceptions qu’il réclame sont
autorisées par les règles en vigueur, et
• montrer que les dérogations sont dans l’intérêt
même de l’UE, dès lors qu’elles minimisent le coût
de l’entrée que doivent supporter les futurs membres
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Table 1:
Approaches to EU Membership and the Accession Negotiations
Passive Reactive Proactive
Gap Analysis:
EU – national rules Yes Yes Yes
Accession Arguments for Arguments for Arguments for
Negotiations transitional derogations derogations (costs derogations (costs
(cost of adjustment) plus safeguard own plus safeguard own
policies) policies; in common interest)
Adoption of acquis No No Internal reform to adjust
within “own model” of and strengthen national
 EU membership policies